养老保险全国统筹、渐进式延迟退休与基金可持续

基于精算模型分析养老金全国统筹与渐进式延迟退休年龄政策对养老保险基金可持续性的影响,结果显示：全国统筹政策在短期使财政负担下降100%,长期内不能有效降低财政负担。在此基础上实施“女先男后”和“男女同步”渐进式延迟退休年龄政策能分别使养老保险累计财政负担降低6.68%和34.36%。为有效减轻养老保险基金支付压力和财政负担,应完善全国统筹政策,并尽快出台渐进式延迟退休年龄方案。     

社会主义新农村建设的由来及其理论框架

社会主义新农村建设是我国经济社会发展的客观需要,体现了城乡统筹发展的战略。它以提高农民收入、改善生产生活条件为核心,以健全村民自治制度为保证,以发展生产夯实农村的物质基础,推动农村精神文明建设、实现农民整体素质的提高。在社会主义新农村建设中,必须坚持市场化、法制化、非农化、民主化,发挥农民的主体地位,力戒形式主义、浮夸攀比之风,循序渐进地推动城乡协调发展。     

养老保险统筹账户：基于可持续运行角度的参数效应研究

文章针对城镇职工基本养老保险统筹账户面临的问题，重建了可持续运行能力的衡量指标。以现行制度为基础构建模型，利用精算方法预测统筹账户收支规模及平均替代率的变化趋势。在对退休年龄、在岗职工的平均工资和参保人数对账户可持续性造成综合影响进行比较静态分析之后发现：提高参保率是较为得力的措施。同时文章还借鉴国外经验提出了相应的政策建议。     

Signaling quality with new product preannouncements: Vaporware and the role of reference quality

This research develops a signaling game that captures the essential dynamics of new product preannouncements (preannouncement/launch/market feedback). New product preannouncements are preannouncing firms' formal efforts to inform their competitors and customers about the future availability, superior quality and introductory price of their upcoming new products. In a market, two firms compete (entrant preannounces and incumbent responds) across two periods. The entrant has private information about the true quality of a new product (the incumbent and customers do not know it), and this informational asymmetry provides the entrant with a preannouncement dilemma. Should the entrant preannounce and, if the entrant does, should the entrant tell the truth about quality? Preannouncements often get customers who might buy now from a competitor to wait for a higher quality to be available. Therefore, the entrant may have an incentive to bluff the quality of a new product in order to enhance the likelihood of customers' waiting. However, because the quality exaggeration is also likely to increase customers' quality expectations, the entrant may suffer a significant sales penalty if the entrant does not deliver the promised quality. Through the signaling game, this paper derives conditions under which such a bluff does/does not put the preannouncing firm at risk (i.e., this paper derives the separating/pooling equilibria that are the focus of signaling games).     

新型军人养老保险制度的构建及其转轨成本测算

我国现行军人养老保险是军队统筹,且保障范围狭窄、制度衔接不畅、实际养老待遇较低、财政负担过重、基金管理效率低下;为实现养老保险制度全民统筹和切实保障军人的养老权益,应构建社会统筹与个人账户相结合、辅以年金账户的新型军人养老保险制度。军人养老保险制度的转轨成本来源于当前军人养老保险制度下隐性债务的显性化,采用系统动力学模型对军人养老保险制度的转轨成本进行模拟测算,结果表明：截至2090年底转轨成本将全部显性化,“老人”和“中人”的转轨成本都呈先增后减的趋势,2035—2065年的转轨成本最高;借助社会统筹账户资金积累的缓冲和人口年龄与人口结构的变化,能够分散制度转轨带来的财务支付风险,改革不会对政府财政带来巨大压力。因此,应坚持养老保险社会统筹的改革方向,积极推进军人养老保险制度改革。     

认知无线电研究综述

本文论证了功利导向的市场化改革不是万能的,至少不适合科研领域。科研的根本动力是人对科学问题的兴趣,而功利化冲淡人对科学的兴趣,使人分心、浮躁和思想不自由,因而不是科研的动力;而是科研的阻力。科学产品具有自然垄断性、公共性、外部性和信息不完全性,因而容易使市场失效。在此基础上,文章还分析了中国科学的进步远不如经济的增长的一个主要原因是中国人的实用主义和功利主义的价值观。     

基于风险共担的供应链融资渠道研究

伴随着现代物流进入21世纪,供应链的衍生服务项目——融资服务正在逐渐兴起。资金周转的压力造成生产商急需相关的融资服务来缓解资金流上的时间风险。在采购融资、存货融资、保理业务等核心服务的基础上,3PL开始了自己的金融服务。但是由于信息不对称,3PL遇到了逆向选择问题。实现风险共担的延迟策略不仅解决了库存成本过高的问题,也为供应链带来了新的融资模式。     

对中小企业技术创新项目风险投资的博弈分析

在中小企业对技术创新项目进行融资的过程中,风险投资是其融资的一个重要途径,而风险投资人与风险企业之间会因利益的分配展开博弈。通过建立风险投资人与风险企业之间的博弈模型,可以看出风险企业对利润率高的技术创新项目进行风险融资的可行性并不高,所以风险投资人应谨慎选择风险企业进行投资,以降低资金风险。     

社会统筹养老金供给的两难困境与政策选择

在中国养老保险制度建立与完善过程中,其主要矛盾仍然是如何筹资和如何给付的问题。社会统筹主要通过提高缴费率和扩大覆盖面两条途径来增加基金供给,而现行制度却面临着养老金供给的两难困境。一是提高缴费率增加了基金收入,但不利于经济增长与扩大覆盖面;二是不同群体实行差别费率有利于扩大覆盖面,但加剧了养老金收支的失衡。经数理模型与实证分析,社会统筹缴费率应该保持适度水平,同时应该对不同群体实行差别费率的政策进行调整,以建立养老保障的长效机制。     

On Rothschild–Stiglitz as Competitive Pooling

Dubey and Geanakoplos (Q J Econ 117:1529–1570, 2002) have developed a theory of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. By recasting the Rothschild–Stiglitz model of insurance in this framework, they find that a separating equilibrium always exists and is unique. We prove that their uniqueness result is not a consequence of the framework, but rather of their definition of refined equilibria. When other types of perturbations are used, the model allows for many pooling allocations to be supported as such: in particular, this is the case for pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.